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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Research in the domain of morality has suggested that disagreement and 
diversity on issues relevant to moral beliefs create a desire for greater social and 
physical distance (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Further, people tend to particularly 
dislike moral diversity when the person they will interact with is close in proximity 
(e.g., a roommate as opposed to a student in the same class; Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 
2003). Skitka and colleagues describe the seeming intolerance produced by moral 
conflict as a function of morality itself rather than attitude strength, and it appears that 
the effects of morality cannot be reduced to some property of attitudes. Also, it seems 
emotional responses and appraisals are both predictors and consequences of moral 
judgments (Haidt, 2001; Skitka, et al., 2005). Given this tendency for avoidance, 
intolerance, and the strong emotional nature of intergroup conflict in the moral domain, 
it seems plausible that there are some elements of prejudice involved in the attitudes 
individuals hold toward moral outgroup members.  
To date the study of moral conflict has been separate from the psychological 
study of prejudice. The integration of theories of prejudice and morality moves the 
investigation of the effects of moral conflict away from trying to explain why morality 
is different from other psychological phenomena and attempts to integrate it with well-
grounded theory. The current work focuses on how emotional responses, decisions of 
avoidance, and other outcomes of conflict may be based on (pre)judgments people hold 
of individuals in moral outgroups. More centrally, this work will seek to investigate 
how moral group memberships differ from strong, non-moral group memberships in 
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 reactions to one’s own ingroup and outgroup. By generating a new framework for 
studying morality and prejudice, hypotheses are generated that have not been explored 
empirically in previous research on moral and non-moral intergroup conflicts. 
Defining Morality 
Moral issues are often at the center of cultural and political conflict. According 
to Krebs (2008) the moral domain encompasses rules that facilitate social cooperation 
which allows survival and reproduction of the species. Similarly, Cohen, Montoya, and 
Insko (2006) define morality in comparable terms; the belief in right and wrong action, 
the tendency to endorse fair relations, and the tendency to favor the ingroup, all 
characterize properties of moral codes. For years, the work of Kohlberg (1971) 
dominated the psychological study of morality with his emphasis on rational models of 
moral reasoning and development. More recently, Haidt (2001) has proposed an 
intuitionist model of moral reasoning that focuses on emotional responses as 
determinants of moral judgments. Haidt and Graham (2007) identify five foundational 
themes that characterize the moral domain: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, 
ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. This approach recognizes the 
importance of social interactions in the domain of morality, but broadens the focus 
beyond the traditional emphasis on fairness (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1971). Shweder and 
colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), too, have expanded conceptions 
of morality in proposing three “ethics”: autonomy, community, and divinity. 
Moral judgments have a number of positive and negative outcomes. Indeed, 
morality leads to many pro-social behaviors, such as charitable giving, grassroots 
activism, or even voting behavior itself (Skitka & Mullen, 2002). However, morality 
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 can lead individuals to a number of negative outcomes as well. Skitka and Houston 
(2001) define moral mandates as strong attitudes that carry with them a sense of moral 
conviction. These attitudes are deeply held, very important to the individual personally, 
and central to that individual’s identity, and it is these mandates that increase the 
potential for conflict. Moral mandates can lead people to be less concerned with due 
process of law during a trial so long as the guilty are punished and the innocent are 
freed (Skitka & Houston, 2001). In their study, Skitka and Houston found that a guilty 
defendant’s death was seen as equally fair regardless of whether it happened through 
the process of a trial or by vigilantism. The effects of perceived moral mandates are 
quite strong and have the potential to make people see individuals or even entire groups 
of people as good or evil. In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, about 
one-half of Americans wanted Arab Americans to carry special identification (for a 
review see Skitka & Mullen, 2002). It seems then, that moral judgments have the 
potential to influence our perceptions of others and possibly in a very flawed way. How 
similar are these (mis)perceptions to other instances of prejudice? 
The Need for a Theoretical Framework Examining Moral Conflict as Prejudice 
Fiske (2004) defines prejudice as an emotional reaction to a person that is rooted 
in feelings about the entire social group that person belongs to. She claims that to 
distinguish prejudice from an evaluative attitude, emotion must be present, which is 
similar to the notion that moral conviction carries with it strong emotional reactions 
(Skitka et al., 2005). More concisely, Allport (1954, p. 6) characterizes prejudice as 
“thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant.” Prejudice also includes a sense of 
perceived inferiority of the outgroup which is crucial to understanding these negative 
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 emotions and evaluations. Despite the fact that positive prejudices exist, especially in 
regard to one’s own ingroup, prejudice as it is generally studied in social psychology 
focuses on the negative connotation of the word (Eagly, 2004; Fiske, 2004). This is not 
to say that positive prejudice is not worthy of study. Indeed, Eagly (2004) affirms that 
attitudes toward women are generally positive even though they are the targets of 
discriminatory behavior. In relation to intergroup conflict and specifically intergroup 
conflict on moral issues, there will rarely be instances with positive outgroup regard, 
however (Skitka et al., 2005). Thus, prejudice as it is defined in this work will focus on 
the negative emotional and evaluative judgment of an outgroup member that places that 
individual in an inferior or disadvantaged position. 
Sources of Prejudice 
 Members of social groups can feel pride in their group membership without 
necessarily feeling any hostility for individuals who are considered outgroup members. 
However, they may still feel a psychological need to feel the ingroup is superior. 
Minimal group studies have shown that group members will typically allocate more 
resources to ingroup members than outgroup members, but that they will not directly 
inflict harm to outgroup members (see Brewer, 1999, for a review). This lack of 
inflicting harm to outgroup members but willingness to place the ingroup at an 
advantage suggests that prejudice can operate simply by favoring the ingroup. However, 
circumstances involving competition over resources and power can give rise to threat 
(Brewer, 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Stephan & Renfro, 
2002), and may temporarily weaken the primacy of the ingroup and create a situation 
where derogation and subjugation of the outgroup becomes a goal. These separate 
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 psychological processes involving ingroup favoritism and outgroup threat may provide 
a way to better understand differences between moral and non-moral conflict and 
prejudice. 
Social identity and ingroup favoritism. Much of the research on identity and 
group membership has recognized the importance of the ingroup relative to outgroups 
(Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999; Aboud, 2003). The ingroup is seen as primary; therefore 
any ideas, beliefs, stereotypes, or attitudes about outgroups can only be formed after one 
identifies with the ingroup. Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue that one becomes a member 
of a social group by both identifying with the group and being identified by others as a 
group member. But group membership itself does not necessarily create conflict or 
negative attitudes towards other social groups. Thus, as Brewer (1999) suggests, 
outgroup attitudes are not entirely reciprocal of ingroup attitudes, and ingroup 
favoritism is a distinct construct from outgroup prejudice. Brewer goes on to state that 
there is a psychological preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar, so this implies 
that avoidance of outgroup members could simply be a function of seeking out what is 
comfortable. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) further states that 
intergroup hostility may occur when outgroups impede the ability of the ingroup to 
achieve positive distinctiveness. Therefore, prejudice may not be a function of simple 
ingroup preference, but rather a desire to see the ingroup as better than relevant 
outgroups.  
Threat and outgroup derogation. The existence of threat and its relationship to 
prejudice is not a new concept. Feshback and Singer (1957) found that personal threat 
was associated with increased social prejudice. Similarly, Crandall (1978) investigated 
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 the effects of personal threats and found that concern for others’ interests was 
significantly reduced following a personal threat. More recently, Bierbrauer and Klinger 
(2002) found that perceived cultural threat was related to less concern for distributive 
justice. These findings suggest that threat has a causal relationship to social prejudice. 
The hypothesized mechanisms by which threat increases prejudice vary, but generally 
focus on the increased concern for the self (Crandall, 1978), increased hostility which is 
displaced on outgroup members (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Feshback & Singer, 1957), and 
increased negative affect (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). This type of prejudice seems quite 
different in nature from a simple desire to increase the standing of the ingroup relative 
to outgroups. Threat seems to create a psychological need to distance oneself from the 
cause of the threat, and in addition minimize the possibility that potential threat 
becomes reality. Indeed, outgroup prejudice is different from ingroup favoritism even in 
children as young as 5 years of age (Aboud, 2003). 
The integrated threat theory of prejudice (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000) distinguishes between realistic and symbolic threats. These two types of 
threat in intergroup contexts can be directed at the group or the individual, and both are 
thought to facilitate prejudice. Realistic threat is anything that threatens the actual 
existence of the group and includes war, threats to political and economic power, and 
threats to the material or physical health of the group. Symbolic threats are defined 
more vaguely but include threats to values or the group’s worldview. From this 
perspective, it may seem like moral conflict can only be symbolically threatening 
because value conflict is a type of conflict over beliefs. However, many moral issues 
may involve aspects of realistic threat through the political nature of many moral issues 
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 such as abortion, affirmative action, environmental issues like global warming, and war 
among others. The true nature of threat in a moral context may be more blurred than has 
been typically thought. Groups that disagree fight for political power in order to carry 
out the acts they see as moral or right. Therefore, moral judgments and disagreement 
carry the potential to be both realistically and symbolically threatening. 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have extended conceptualizations of threat by 
identifying different emotional reactions to different types of groups based on the type 
of threat posed. They suggest five primary emotional reactions to perceptions of threat: 
anger, disgust, fear, pity, and guilt. The types of threat include obstacles to the ingroup 
(anger), contamination of the ingroup (disgust), endangered group safety (fear), threats 
to reciprocity (pity), and threat to perceptions of ingroup morality (guilt). They suggest 
that prejudice as traditionally conceptualized does not distinguish between the different 
types of thoughts and stereotypes people hold about different groups. Rather, they 
suggest that specific groups will elicit very specific threats and therefore very specific 
emotions, and thus no general measure of prejudice is sufficient. More recently, 
Neuberg and Cottrell (2008) stated that outgroup prejudice can be a function of threat, 
such that in the absence of a threat posed by the outgroup, prejudice exhibited by an 
individual should be significantly reduced. Morality certainly has the potential to elicit 
specific emotional and threat-based responses, so it is very possible that feelings of 
prejudice exist in a moral context. Nevertheless, Cottrell and Neuberg hypothesize that 
threats to ingroup morality are associated specifically with guilt. This may be an 
incomplete characterization of the sort of threat raised in a moral context. Morality may 
in fact permeate many kinds of specific threats and thus elicit more emotions than guilt 
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 alone. For example, anger, disgust, and fear may all be elicited by the thought of a 
moral outgroup member because of the outgroup potentially impeding the ingroup’s 
desire to gain power (i.e., anger), the thought of immoral others potentially interacting 
with the ingroup (i.e., disgust), and the thought of a moral outgroup member as 
potentially dangerous to the safety of the ingroup’s values (i.e., fear). By this reasoning, 
moral conflict may be one rare instance where a general prejudice may exist. If an 
individual perceives moral rules to be universal, then those who do not follow the rules 
are seen as immoral and threatening. Potentially, moral conflict may increase all types 
of negative emotions when thinking about moral outgroup members because of the 
multiple types of threat posed. 
A recent analysis of talk show host Bill O’Reilly found that he used name 
calling about nine times every minute on his show (Conway, Grabe, & Grieves, 2007). 
One of the main reasons given for calling names or labeling groups as “evil” or 
“villains” is simply that they are a “moral threat” (Conway, et al., 2007, p. 213). This 
vague but powerful language seems consistent with the notion that threat may be felt in 
a very indistinguishable fashion because there are in fact multiple threats posed by 
moral conflict. The existence of threat in a moral context increases the relevance of the 
outgroup, and while the ingroup may still be psychologically primary, the need to label 
groups, call names, and generally derogate and subjugate the outgroup increases. This 
type of prejudice seems different from simple ingroup favoritism, which largely reflects 
a need for positive distinctiveness. Theorizing that threat posed by the outgroup is a 
central feature of some types of prejudice may raise questions about the sufficiency of 
Brewer’s (1999, p. 435) concept of “moral superiority,” which states that when the 
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 moral rules are seen as absolute and there is a difference between groups in moral 
judgments, the love of the ingroup will lead to vilification of the outgroup. Although 
this is apt to be the case, it nevertheless fails to emphasize the significance of outgroup 
threat. Thus, one of the main goals of the present research will be to determine the 
relative importance of ingroup “love” versus outgroup derogation in moral versus non-
moral contexts. It is hypothesized from this framework that ingroup positivity (i.e., 
attachment to the ingroup) may be less central and outgroup negativity (i.e., outgroup 
derogation) more central for memberships based on moral judgments compared to other 
group memberships that are not based on moral judgments. 
Similarities of Moral Conflict to Traditional Prejudice 
In order to articulate why an empirical investigation that combines morality with 
traditional social psychological approaches to the study of prejudice is appropriate, it is 
necessary to define how group memberships founded on moral judgments are similar to, 
and different from, other types of group memberships. One of the more compelling 
arguments for a strong relationship between conflict in morality and prejudice is the 
approach taken by Cohen et al. (2006), which analyzes conflicts in morality through the 
framework of interdependence theory (Kelly & Thibaut, 1978). Interdependence theory 
makes the distinction between correspondence and noncorrespondence, or more 
specifically, the degree to which conflict will be observed in an interaction. Viewing 
moral conflict this way, individuals or groups will see outcomes of conflict in morality 
as noncorrespondent, or zero-sum, regardless of whether the noncorrespondence is real 
or simply perceived. This has clear links to Realistic Group Conflict theory (LeVine & 
Campbell, 1972) in that conflict involving the interests between groups may produce 
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 real intergroup conflicts. However, moral conflicts have the added potential for conflict 
even if the difference in group interests is only perceived. Furthermore, conflict on 
moral issues may not entail only realistic interests and goals, but may contain symbolic 
components as well (Stephan & Renfro, 2002). If moral conflicts are perceived as 
noncorrespondent, then a clear goal for individuals in this type of conflict will be to 
place the moral outgroup at a disadvantage.  The assumption is that if members of my 
group are right (i.e., our moral position is correct), members of groups that disagree 
with us are necessarily wrong.  Skitka and colleagues’ work (e.g., Skitka, et al., 2005; 
Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Skitka & Houston, 2001) has demonstrated the power of moral 
mandates to produce intolerance and disregard of the rights of outgroup members. This 
intolerance is also associated with strong emotional reactions that seem very similar to 
the negative affect described by Fiske (2004) in her definition of prejudice. 
Groups defined in terms of moral judgments differ from groups that typically 
come to mind when considering prejudice. A major difference is in the societal status of 
the groups. Historically, many groups such as African Americans, women, 
homosexuals, and other marginalized groups, have had a clearly lower social status than 
the dominant social group (Dasgupta, 2004). Moral identities and group memberships 
do not inherently carry any ascribed status, and are simply beliefs about the rightness of 
an action. The groups are typically not distinguished on the basis of societal status or 
stigma.  
Another major difference between group memberships founded on moral 
judgments and other social group memberships is the extent to which membership in a 
group is regarded as fixed. Morality is not similar to ethnicity or gender, where one 
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 cannot typically switch group membership. Rather, one may potentially change his or 
her attitude on some highly contested moral issue (e.g., abortion). This may provide 
justification for the derogation of outgroups because of the perception of choice. 
Individuals may feel that in order for a certain group to deserve equal treatment, 
members must simply change their beliefs to coincide with the ingroup’s moral code. 
The fundamental nature of morality (i.e., the belief in the correctness of one’s views) 
coupled with the perception of group permeability may override any sense of egalitarian 
values and therefore legitimize derogation of the outgroup and discrimination. 
Current Study 
Moral conflict is a type of group conflict. Previous research (e.g., Skitka, et al., 
2005) has focused on emotional intensity as one of the primary reasons why moral 
convictions differ from other strongly held, but non-moral convictions. For this reason, 
comparisons made between moral groups and non-moral groups will only be valid if 
both group types are associated with very strong emotions. It is unlikely that emotional 
intensity alone can entirely account for why moral convictions are so strong, but 
emotions may nevertheless help us better understand the nature of moral prejudice. 
Integrating theories of prejudice with the study of moral conflict can allow us to make 
predictions about not only the intensity of the emotions felt, but also to what group 
emotions will be directed. 
 The current research posits that reactions to outgroup members should be more 
negative in a moral context than a non-moral context due to the presence of threat. 
Attachment to the ingroup, however, should be lower in a moral context (due to the 
relatively greater psychological focus on the outgroup), and therefore ingroup regard 
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 should be more positive in the non-moral context. These hypotheses should manifest 
themselves through differences on traditional indices of prejudice such as emotion, 
threat, feelings regarding the relative proximity or distance of group members, trait 
stereotypes, and attitude stereotypes (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kinder & Sears, 1981; 
Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007; Skitka, et al., 2005). Although the emotional intensity felt 
about group memberships should be relatively equal in the two conditions (moral and 
non-moral), the object of the intense emotions should vary by the context. Specifically, 
negative outgroup-directed emotions should be felt more strongly when thinking of a 
moral outgroup member than a non-moral outgroup member. Conversely, positive 
ingroup-directed emotion should be higher when thinking about non-moral ingroup 
members than moral ingroup members. In addition, outgroups should be perceived as 
more threatening by moral groups as compared with non-moral groups. And individuals 
should also prefer greater avoidance of moral outgroup members compared to non-
moral outgroup members, but should feel more favorably towards non-moral ingroup 
members who are close in proximity compared to moral ingroup members. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Design 
 The design of the study was a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design. The group type was 
a within-participant factor, and participants evaluated both their ingroup and outgroup. 
The between-participants factor was the type of group evaluated. Participants in the 
moral group condition were individuals who were in strong support of legal abortion; 
they evaluated people who were “pro-choice” (ingroup) and “pro-life” (outgroup). In 
the non-moral condition, Boston Red Sox fans evaluated groups of people who were 
fans of both the Boston Red Sox (ingroup) and New York Yankees (outgroup). 
Participants 
 One hundred forty undergraduate students (mean age = 19.7) at the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, participated in the study for course credit. There were 82 
participants (64 females) in the moral condition and 58 participants (42 females) in the 
non-moral condition. Due to the gendered nature of the conditions, the conditions were 
balanced such that the proportion of males and females within each condition was 
relatively equal. In addition, gender did not moderate any of the effects in the study and 
thus will not be discussed further. The participants were recruited based on their 
responses to the Psychology Department prescreen questionnaire. Six likert-scale 
responses were used in determining eligibility. Participants who were assigned to the 
moral issue condition were recruited based on their responses to how they view the 
legality of abortion and how important the issue is to them personally. Attitudes towards 
abortion were measured in two ways. Participants were asked the degree to which they 
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 were in favor of both legal abortion and illegal abortion. These questions were 
measured on 9-point scales and eligible participants responded that they were strongly 
in support of legal abortion (i.e., 8 or 9) and strongly opposed to illegal abortion (i.e., 1 
or 2). Participants were also asked how important abortion is to them personally, and 
eligible participants responded 8 or 9 (i.e., very important) on a 9-point scale.  
Potential participants for the non-moral condition were asked how they felt 
about two different professional baseball teams in the Northeastern United States. The 
first asked how much they approve of the Boston Red Sox while the second asked how 
much they approve of the New York Yankees. These two teams were picked due to the 
historical rivalry and potentially strong emotions related to how individuals feel about 
these teams. In order to ensure an ingroup-outgroup perception paralleling the moral 
condition, participants were only recruited for the non-moral condition if they indicated 
that they strongly approved of the Boston Red Sox (i.e., 8 or 9 on a 9 point scale) and 
strongly disapproved (i.e., 1 or 2) of the New York Yankees. The final question 
assessed how important the Boston Red Sox are to them personally and acceptable 
responses were again 8 or 9 on a 9 point scale.  
Procedure 
Participants were told upon entering the lab that they were going to participate 
in a study assessing perceptions of various social groups. They were not told until after 
the study was completed that they were recruited based on their responses to items on 
the prescreen questionnaire. They completed a questionnaire asking them to respond to 
several scales measuring their attitudes regarding two different social groups. For those 
in the morality condition, the rated groups were people who identified as “pro-life” and 
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 “pro-choice” on the issue of abortion. For those in the non-moral condition, the two 
groups were fans of the Boston Red Sox and fans of the New York Yankees. These 
attitude scales measured affect directed at the group, how threatened they feel by the 
group, desired social distance, personality trait adjectives they feel members of the 
group possess, and attitudes they believe those group members hold about other 
political and moral issues. Finally, all participants were asked to think about their 
responses to the previous items and state how prejudiced they feel they are in general, 
and how prejudiced they feel they are with respect to the groups they appraised. 
Questionnaires were counterbalanced so that participants had an equal chance of rating 
either an ingroup or outgroup first. 
Materials 
 In order to assess a series of diverse prejudice-related measures, a single 
questionnaire consisting of items measuring emotion, threat, beliefs about group 
personality traits, desire for social distance, beliefs about group attitude traits, and 
general beliefs about personal prejudice was utilized. 
Emotion. Items measuring affect covered specific discrete emotions and general 
positivity or negativity on a 9-point scale (0 = “Not at all”, 8 = “Extremely”). An 
example of a specific emotion item was “To what extent do you feel anger when 
thinking about people who are pro-life?” General affect items asked the same question 
but replaced the specific emotion with the words “positive” and “negative” (see 
Appendix for a complete list of the emotion items). 
Threat. Items measuring threat covered both general and specific types of threat 
and were assessed using a 9-point scale (-4 = “Strongly Disagree”, 4 = “Strongly 
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 Agree”). An example of a general threat item was “People who identify as pro-choice 
are a threat to American society.” Specific threat items did not use the word “threat” but 
rather focused on the five types of specific threat identified by Cottrell and Neuberg 
(2005). A sample item was “People who are fans of the Boston Red Sox are not 
trustworthy.” All items measuring affect and threat were adapted from measures 
designed by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) (for a complete list of the threat items, see 
Appendix). 
 Social Distance. Measures of social distance were adapted from Skitka et al. 
(2005) and were measured on 9-point scales ranging from “Not at all” (1) to 
“Extremely” (9). This task involved responding to various endings of a sentence starting 
with “I would be happy to have someone who (was pro-life or pro-choice / was a fan of 
the Boston Red Sox or New York Yankees) …” The endings of the sentence 
participants responded to were “to be the President of the United States,” “Governor of 
my state,” “a neighbor,” “the owner of a store I regularly shop at,” “my personal 
doctor,” “my spiritual advisor,” “a close friend,” “someone I would personally date,” “a 
roommate,” “someone who marries into my family,” “the teacher of my children,” and 
“a co-worker.” Items were reverse scored such that higher numbers represent a greater 
desire for social distance. 
Trait Stereotypes. Beliefs about group traits were adapted from items 
traditionally used to measure knowledge of cultural stereotypes of African-Americans 
(see Stangor, 2000). These beliefs were measured by having participants check the traits 
they believed group members possessed out of a list of 30 possible personality traits. 
Some of these traits were generated specifically to be more relevant to the types of 
 16 
 
 groups being evaluated in the current study. The traits measured consisted of: lazy, fun, 
ignorant, religious, stupid, naïve, unreliable, pleasure-loving, sensitive, gregarious, 
aggressive, materialistic, loyal, arrogant, ambitious, tradition-loving, hostile, sloppy, 
empathetic, intelligent, unsympathetic, cold, cruel, intolerant, ill-intentioned, selfish, 
uncaring, moral, and immoral.  
 Attitude Stereotypes. Participants also indicated the extent to which they felt that 
members of the groups they evaluated were in support of or opposed to various political 
issues. These issues were affirmative action, stem cell research, taxes on sport utility 
vehicles and luxury cars, capital punishment, the Iraq war, government welfare 
programs, taxes on the wealthy, same sex marriage, legalization of marijuana, and 
adoption of children by same sex couples. Each item was measured on a 9-point scale 
ranging from -4 (strongly oppose) to 4 (strongly in favor of). 
 Explicit Prejudice. Measures of participants’ self-perceptions as prejudiced were 
designed to measure the extent to which participants believed they were prejudiced 
toward various groups. Four items were used and asked about participants’ prejudice 
toward individuals of other races, of other religions, and the two specific social groups 
they had previously evaluated. Each item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 
0 (Not at all) to 6 (Extremely).  
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 CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Analytic Plan 
 Analyses were grouped by the types of dependent variables and were generally 
evaluated using mixed ANOVAs with the condition (moral group or non-moral group) 
as the between-participants factor and group type (ingroup or outgroup) as the within-
participant factor. Dependent variables for these analyses were grouped by ratings of 
emotions felt toward the groups, feelings of threat when thinking about the groups, 
desire for social distance, perceived attitudes of the groups on various political issues, 
and the degree to which participants were willing to indicate that they felt prejudice 
toward the different groups of people. Table 1 presents descriptive information about all 
the dependent measures and Table 2 presents correlations among those variables. 
Emotion 
 Exploratory factor analyses using maximum likelihood estimation and promax 
rotation were conducted to determine whether the emotion items were measuring 
similar latent constructs or distinct emotions. These analyses were conducted on the 18 
ingroup and 18 outgroup emotions separately. Results indicated that for the ingroup 
emotions, a two factor structure fit the data well. The two factors seemed to represent 
positive and negative emotions, and these were negatively correlated, r = -.46. The 
emotions of anger, disgust, pity, resent, anxiety, guilt, hurt, sadness, and general 
negativity loaded on the first factor. The second factor consisted of respect, happiness, 
pride, security, and general positivity. Envy, contempt, and sympathy for the ingroup 
did not load on either factor.  
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 Analyses of outgroup emotions revealed a similar structure to the data. Two 
factors emerged with a nearly identical structure to that of the factors for ingroup 
emotions and were again negatively correlated, r = -.42. Outgroup-directed guilt did not 
load strongly on either positive or negative emotion and was not included in the 
aggregate measures. In order to ensure that the aggregate measures of emotion were 
measuring the same construct, all items that did not load consistently between the 
ingroup and outgroup analyses were dropped. Disgust, fear, pity, anxiety, hurt, sad, and 
negativity constituted the first factor. The second factor included emotions of respect, 
happiness, pride, security, and positivity. Aggregates of the emotions were then created 
by creating the mean score of all items on a particular factor. These factors seemed to 
represent a relative positive and negative dimension of the emotions, and so the four 
composites were labeled “positive ingroup emotion,” “negative ingroup emotion,” 
“positive outgroup emotion,” and “negative outgroup emotion.” Reliability estimates 
were obtained for each of the four groups of dependent measures. Internal consistency 
was high for positive ingroup emotion (α = .93), positive outgroup emotion (α = .81), 
negative outgroup emotion (α = .91), and negative ingroup emotion (α = .84). Tables 3 
and 4 present the factor loadings for each emotion for ingroup and outgroup emotions 
respectively. 
Two separate mixed ANOVAs were conducted on positive and negative 
emotions. The group type (ingroup or outgroup) and condition (moral group or non-
moral group) interacted in predicting both positive emotions, F(1,138) = 10.46, p = 
.002, η2 = .07 (see Figure 1) and negative emotions, F(1,138) = 10.16, p = .002, η2 = .07 
(see Figure 2).  For positive emotions, these variables interacted in such a way that the 
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 ingroup was seen more positively in the non-moral condition than in the moral 
condition t(138) = 3.91, p < .001, and the outgroup-directed positive emotions did not 
differ between the conditions, t < 1. For negative emotions, the interaction was in the 
reverse direction, such that the outgroup elicited more negativity in the moral condition 
than in the non-moral condition, t(138) = -3.49, p < .001. The difference between the 
conditions on negative ingroup-directed emotions was not statistically significant, t < 1.    
Threat 
 Exploratory factor analyses were conducted on the threat items to discern 
whether it would be necessary to differentiate between the different types of threat (e.g., 
individual versus group; realistic versus symbolic). These analyses were conducted on 
those items measuring the perception of threat due to the ingroup and outgroup 
separately. Results indicated that a one-factor solution was ideal in both cases. For the 
ingroup, the extracted factor explained 55.0% of the total variance in the 10 items and 
had an internal consistency of .91. For the items measuring outgroup threat, the 
extracted factor explained 67.6% of the total variance and had an internal consistency of 
.95.  
 Aggregate measures of threat were obtained by averaging across all 10 items 
separately for the ingroup and outgroup. A mixed ANOVA was run on the aggregates 
and as expected, a group type by condition interaction emerged, F(1,138) = 89.90, p < 
.001, η2 = .39 (see Figure 3). There was also a strong main effect of the group type, 
F(1,138) = 225.84, p < .001, η2 = .62, with outgroups seen as more threatening than 
ingroups, but this difference was much greater in the moral t(81) = 16.37, p < .001, d = 
2.45, than the non-moral condition, t(57) = 5.13, p < .001, d = .68. This interaction 
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 suggests that outgroups were perceived as more threatening in the moral condition than 
in the non-moral condition. Simple effect analyses revealed that the difference between 
the perception of threat of the outgroup was significantly greater in the moral condition 
than in the non-moral condition, t(138) = 9.63, p < .001, d = 1.64; this difference was 
not significant when comparing ingroup threat, t(138) = 0.36, n.s.  
 Correlations between threat and measures of emotion were calculated to 
determine the extent to which threat was related to the evaluative emotional reactions to 
each group. This was done separately by condition because it was thought that threat 
might have different associations within each condition. In the moral condition, 
perceived ingroup and outgroup threat were not correlated, r(80) = .09, n.s. Ingroup 
threat was significantly related to positive ingroup emotion, r(80) = -.48, p < .001, and 
negative ingroup emotion, r(80) = .62, p < .001. However, outgroup threat was related 
to positive ingroup-directed emotion, r(80) = .38, p < .001, positive outgroup-directed 
emotion, r(80) = -.35, p = .001, and negative outgroup emotion, r(80) = .56, p < .001. In 
the non-moral condition, perceptions of threat posed by the ingroup and outgroup were 
significantly correlated, r(56) = .55, p < .001, but outgroup threat was only related to 
negative outgroup-directed emotion, r(56) = .44, p < .001.  
Social Distance 
 Exploratory factor analyses were again used to determine if the 12 items 
measuring desire for social distance were measuring a single latent construct. The 
analysis for both the ingroup and outgroup items revealed that a one-factor solution fit 
the data well. The extracted factor for the ingroup items explained 69.0% of the 
variance while factor for the outgroup items explained 62.2% of the variance. 
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 Reliability estimates were high for both the ingroup (α = .96) and the outgroup (α = 
.95). Based on these data, two aggregate measures of social distance were obtained by 
averaging across the 12 ingroup items and the 12 outgroup items. These aggregate 
measures were then reversed scored such that higher numbers represent a greater desire 
for social distance. 
 There was no significant interaction between the group type and the condition 
for the social distance items, F < 1. However, there were strong main effects for both 
the group type, F(1,138) = 452.24, p < .001, η2 = .77, as well as the condition, F(1,138) 
= 7.96, p = .005, η2 = .06 (see Figure 4). These main effects were in such a direction 
that participants desired less social distance when thinking about the potential targets as 
ingroup members than as outgroup members. The difference between the conditions 
suggested that those in the non-moral condition desired less social distance overall than 
those in the moral condition regardless of the group type. Simple effect analyses 
revealed that participants in the non-moral condition desired less distance when 
thinking about ingroup members as close than did participants in the moral condition, 
t(138) = 2.12, p = .036, d = .37. For outgroup social distance, participants in the moral 
condition desired more distance than did those in the non-moral condition, however this 
difference did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, t(138) = 1.56, p = 
.122, d = .26. 
 Finally, correlations between the ingroup and outgroup ratings of social distance 
were computed. In previous research on 30 different ethnic groups in East Africa, no 
correlation was found between ingroup regard and social distance toward outgroups 
(see Brewer, 1999 for a review). However, in the present study, greater acceptance of 
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 ingroups was negatively correlated with outgroup social distance in the moral condition 
r(80) = -.27, p = .016, while no correlation existed in the non-moral condition, r(56) = -
.01, p = .92. In addition, these social distance measures were correlated with the 
measures of threat. In the non-moral condition, threat was neither related to ingroup nor 
outgroup social distance (all ps > .05). However, in the moral condition perceived threat 
from the ingroup was related to greater preferred social distance to the ingroup, r(80) = 
-.65, p < .001. Moral outgroup threat was related to both a greater desire for social 
distance from the outgroup, r(80) = -.61, p < .001, and a reduced desire for distance 
from the ingroup, r(80) = .31, p = .005. 
Trait Stereotypes 
 As an exploratory analysis, participants were asked to indicate which personality 
traits they believed ingroup and outgroup members possessed from a list of 30 traits. 
The proportion of participants that indicated an affirmative response for the trait was 
used as a measure of stereotype endorsement. In the moral condition, the five most 
frequently selected traits for the ingroup were “intelligent” (63.4%), “moral” (59.8%), 
“competent” (57.3%), “sensitive” (50.0%), and “empathetic” (45.1%). For the outgroup, 
the five most commonly selected traits were, “very religious” (90.2%), “tradition-
loving” (64.6%), “ignorant” (58.5%), unsympathetic (48.8%), and “intolerant” (47.6%). 
In the non-moral condition, the five most common ingroup stereotypes were “fun” 
(96.6%), “tradition-loving” (81.0%), “pleasure-loving” (69.0%), “ambitious” (60.3%), 
and “loyal to family” (55.2%), while the five common outgroup stereotypes were 
“aggressive” (67.2%), “arrogant” (60.3%), “tradition-loving” (55.2%), “ignorant” 
(51.7%), and “hostile” (50.0%). Additionally, in an attempt to more fully capture how 
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 ingroups and outgroups were perceived, an exploratory analysis examined a total 
“stereotyping” measure. These measures were created by summing the total number of 
adjectives selected across all 30 traits for the ingroup and outgroup respectively. These 
were thought to represent the extent to which the groups were seen as homogenous. A 
mixed ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between the group type and the 
condition, F(1,138) = 37.04, p < .001, η2 = .21 (see Figure 5). Paired samples 
comparisons were conducted within each condition to test whether more adjectives 
were endorsed as representative for ingroups and outgroups. As expected, significantly 
more adjectives were checked for moral outgroups (M = 7.29, SD = 3.50) than moral 
ingroups (M = 4.91, SD = 2.92), t(81) = 8.31, p < .0001, d = .74. However, there was no 
evidence that non-moral ingroups (M = 8.62, SD = 5.30) were thought to be more 
homogenous than non-moral outgroups (M = 8.28, SD = 5.93), t < 1. Examining these 
measures between conditions, it appears that traits checked for outgroups were not 
different between conditions, t(138) = 1.23, n.s, however more traits were checked for 
non-moral ingroups than moral ingroups, t(138) = 5.30, p < .001, d = .87. 
Attitude Stereotypes  
  Participants were asked the extent to which they believed members of ingroups 
and outgroups were in favor of or opposed various contemporary political and moral 
issues. It was thought that participants in the moral condition would polarize the group 
differences more than those in the non-moral condition. More specifically, the 
perceived difference between the ingroup and outgroup was expected to be greater in 
the moral condition compared to the non-moral condition. 
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  The Bonferroni correction was used to adjust the alpha level in comparing the 
ingroup and outgroup differences. There were 10 paired comparisons within each 
condition, so an alpha level of .005 was used. This correction was made because no a 
priori hypothesis existed as to whether the ingroup and outgroup would be perceived as 
different on any particular issue. The results supported  the hypothesis that greater 
polarization between the ingroup and outgroup would be perceived in the moral 
condition relative to the non-moral condition. In the non-moral condition, two of the ten 
comparisons revealed a significant perceived difference between the ingroup and 
outgroup. Participants perceived fans of the Boston Red Sox as more in favor of taxes 
on sport utility vehicles and luxury cars compared to fans of the New York Yankees, 
t(57) = 3.02, p = .004, d = .31, while they also perceived fans of Boston to be more in 
favor of same sex marriage than fans of New York, t(57) = 3.28, p = .002, d = .46. 
Results from the comparisons within the moral condition, however, revealed significant 
differences between the perception of ingroup and outgroup attitudes on affirmative 
action t(81) = 4.90, p < .0001, d = .93, stem cell research, t(81) = 18.53, p < .0001, d = 
3.16, taxes on SUVs, t(81) = 5.73, p < .0001, d = 1.04, the Iraq war, t(81) = 6.87, p < 
.0001, d = 1.20, government welfare, t(81) = 9.28, p < .0001, d = 1.60, taxes on the 
wealthy, t(81) = 4.47, p < .0001, d = .75, same sex marriage, t(81) = 20.29, p < .0001, d 
= 3.44, legalization of marijuana, t(81) = 13.39, p < .0001, d = 2.23, and adoption of 
children by same sex couples, t(81) = 19.76, p < .0001, d = 3.07. 
Explicit Prejudice 
 Participants were asked to what degree they felt prejudice toward individuals of 
a different race, of a different religion, and the two groups they had previously 
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 evaluated. No differences existed between the conditions on the degree to which 
participants felt prejudice toward different racial or religious groups (all ts < 1). 
Interestingly, the extent to which participants felt prejudice toward the specific outgroup 
they evaluated in the study did not differ between the moral and non-moral conditions, t 
< 1. The mean level of self-reported prejudice for the moral condition (M = 2.45, SD = 
1.74) was nearly identical to that of the non-moral condition (M = 2.62, SD = 1.96). 
Furthermore, the willingness to express such prejudice was greater for these outgroups 
than for racial and religious outgroups, regardless of condition, F(2,276) = 107.65, p < 
.001, η2 = .44. This suggests some degree of legitimization of self-reported prejudice; 
however, the mean level of outgroup prejudice was still below the midpoint of the scale 
on which it was measured for both conditions, further suggesting that this is not 
overwhelmingly recognized as prejudice.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 The major hypotheses in the current study were supported. Generally, there 
seemed to be greater positivity directed towards non-moral ingroups than moral 
ingroups, while greater negativity seemed to be directed toward moral outgroups 
relative to non-moral outgroups. This suggests that ingroup favoritism and a desire for 
positive distinctiveness may be greater in a non-moral context, and these effects follow 
predictions based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Outgroup 
derogation, however, seems to be greater in contexts of moral conflict, and these 
findings are consistent with threat-based theories of prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005, Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). These results were 
consistently supported across a number of measures in the study.  
Moral outgroups seemed to elicit strong negative outgroup-directed emotions. 
Non-moral outgroups elicited these emotions less than moral outgroups despite the fact 
that both groups reported strong emotions. The distinctiveness of non-moral group 
memberships seems to be the elicitation of positive emotions directed at the ingroup to a 
greater extent than moral ingroups, supportive of the hypothesis that attachment to the 
ingroup would be greater for non-moral group memberships. Overall, it seems Skitka’s 
suggestion (Skitka, et al., 2005) that emotional intensity may differentiate moral 
conviction from other strong attitudes may not be entirely correct. While emotional 
intensity may indeed be a requirement, the object of that emotion may characterize 
moral conviction as opposed to non-moral conviction. 
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 The findings on threat also suggest that moral outgroups seem to be perceived 
differently from non-moral outgroups. Relatively low levels of threat existed for both 
ingroups and for the non-moral outgroup; however, moral outgroups produced much 
higher levels of threat. Additionally, threat in the moral condition was correlated with 
emotion and social distance, while this was not true in the non-moral condition. This 
lends strong support to the hypothesis that not only is perceived threat much greater 
when thinking about moral outgroups, but that this threat is predictive of how one feels 
about the group and the extent to which one desires distance from the outgroup. 
Although this study does not address the nature of causation, one could reasonably 
speculate based on these data that outgroup derogation in a moral context could be a 
function of the level of threat perceived. 
The results on the social distance measures paralleled those on emotion and 
threat. Participants in both conditions had a strong preference for outgroup social 
distance relative to ingroups. Lower social distance scores arose for the ingroup in the 
non-moral context, but the moral outgroup received marginally greater social distance 
scores relative to the non-moral context. This may represent ingroup favoritism for the 
sports team identities with less outgroup hostility intended. However, the marginally 
greater social distance preferred in the moral context may represent threat-based 
outgroup hostility that operates in addition to ingroup attachment, again suggesting that 
love of the ingroup may not be sufficient to explain one’s “prejudice” in a moral 
context.  
 Another finding supporting greater focus on the outgroup relative to the ingroup 
in moral group memberships was the greater number of personality trait adjectives 
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 checked when thinking about the outgroup in moral context. The cognitive 
representations we hold about moral group memberships may be more consistent, or 
possibly even more important, for the outgroup relative to the ingroup. Finally, the 
importance of the outgroup in the moral condition was emphasized by the extremity of 
the perceived polarization of attitudes on other social issues. This indicates that in a 
moral context, there is a perception that cross-cutting group memberships are less apt to 
exist, and that outgroup members on one issue will most likely be outgroup members on 
other moral issues. If this polarization is greater than the actual difference in the 
populations’ true attitudes, then the perceived difference itself may be contributing to a 
greater perception of threat than is warranted. One problem with this attitude measure in 
comparing the moral and non-moral conditions is the fact that the use of other moral 
issues may itself have contributed to the greater number of perceived differences in the 
moral condition. The use of issues related to baseball may have indeed provided 
opposite results. Therefore, a question for future research is the degree to which 
participants in the moral condition perceive outgroup members to be different on other 
issues.  
 In sum, social identity seems to be important in both a moral and non-moral 
context. Across all measures in the study, very strong differences were observed 
between the ingroups and outgroups, regardless of condition. What is interesting in 
these findings is that the observed interactions were present over and above these very 
strong ingroup-outgroup effects. Additionally, because of these findings, ingroup “love” 
seems to adequately describe the non-moral group, but does not seem to be a sufficient 
characterization of prejudice for the moral group. There are high emotions in both 
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 cases; however, the object of the most intense emotions differs depending on the 
context. There is little doubt that ingroup-outgroup perceptions begin with ingroup 
favoritism in both cases, but this appears to move to an emphasis on outgroup 
derogation when threat from the outgroup is high, as was the case in the moral-group 
context in this study. This is highlighted by the fact that threat was related to many of 
the other outcomes in the study, such as emotion and social distance, in the moral 
condition but not in the non-moral condition. Therefore, threat seems to be a key to 
understanding moral prejudice. 
 A question that arises from this research is why moral outgroups are seen as so 
threatening relative to non-moral outgroups. The impression that moral conflicts are 
zero-sum (Cohen, et al., 2006) may contribute to the perception that moral judgments 
create dichotomous groups. The perceived “correctness” of a moral position may 
influence individuals to believe that if the ingroup is right, then the outgroup is 
necessarily wrong. It seems from the present data that multiple threats exist, which 
encourages a belief that the outgroup is a threat to an entire way of living, and that these 
threats are both realistic and symbolic. Furthermore, the perception of the threat is what 
matters because these threats are probably both real and imagined. Where this differs 
from other types of group conflict may lie in the fact that other outgroups can always 
emerge in non-moral contexts. Non-moral social identities such as race and religion can 
be maintained without an outgroup. Catholics can still remain Catholic without the 
presence of Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Atheists, or other religious groups. 
Similarly, if the New York Yankees were disbanded, Boston Red Sox fans could 
eventually develop rivalries with other teams. However, part of the team’s history is 
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 deeply rooted in its rivalries, and while fans may even express positive feelings about 
the idea of a hated rival disbanding, part of the allure of the ingroup membership would 
be lost if such an important outgroup vanished.  
In contrast, many people strongly in support of, or opposed to, legal abortion 
would indeed rejoice at the idea of the disappearance of the outgroup and actually mean 
it. The threat posed by the outgroup would suddenly disappear, making a moral identity 
such as pro-choice lose its importance and salience if there were no group that opposed 
an individual’s belief on abortion. There are many moral issues like this where social 
consensus across members of a culture and even cross-culturally is nearly universal, 
such as incest. There is no strong or salient moral identity based on that issue because 
there is no strong outgroup, although people still feel strongly that this is a moral issue 
(Haidt, 2001). Therefore, moral conflicts and in turn the salience of a moral group 
membership is directly linked to the existence of an outgroup. Because of this, moral 
conflicts may shift focus away from the ingroup; the outgroup is threatening because by 
virtue of its very existence, it suggests that the beliefs of the ingroup are being seriously 
challenged. 
Limitations 
 There are several limitations to the methodology of the current study and the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the present data. First, and potentially most 
problematic, is that the participants in this study were all members of regionally 
normative groups. Without knowing the minority group members’ attitudes about the 
majority groups, it cannot be determined whether the differences between the moral and 
non-moral conditions are representative of the other groups. For example, people 
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 identified as pro-life may perceive different types of threat from those who are pro-
choice. Furthermore, people who are strong fans of the New York Yankees who live in 
an area that is heavily dominated by fans of their team’s biggest rival could be 
considerably more or less prejudiced depending on their reactions to the normative 
groups. There were also no measures of intergroup contact in this study, which could 
also inform the results, because claims cannot be made that the two conditions were 
equivalent in the extent to which they have contact with the nonnormative outgroups. 
However, despite this weakness, there were clearly elements of prejudice in both 
conditions in the present study. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) predict that 
nonnormative groups should be met with hostility, but the fact that outgroup-directed 
hostility seemed to be greater in the moral condition suggests that majority status does 
not alone predict intergroup prejudice.  
 Another limitation to the current study was the use of a student sample. As with 
all psychological research on student samples, a serious question of whether the 
findings here can generalize to a broader population arises. However, the use of 
students in this case may not have been inappropriate. What is necessary to make any 
inference is the requirement that the group memberships studied in the present case 
were all based on strong convictions. This requirement was not only met by the careful 
selection of participants who were strongly identified members of their respective 
groups, but the results of the study indicate that there was indeed very strong conviction 
in both samples. 
 A final limitation was the use of self-report measures in attempting to gauge 
prejudice. Research in social psychology in the last 15 years has increasingly 
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 recognized the problematic nature of individual’s willingness to report prejudice 
explicitly (Dasgupta, 2004). Self reports have become more unreliable than in the past 
due to the socially unacceptable nature of prejudice, and undeniably the word 
“prejudice” itself has taken on a very negative cultural connotation. This was indeed 
found in the current study with participants’ unwillingness to admit to prejudice 
directed toward members of other races or religions. Therefore, the question arises as to 
whether individuals’ “true” attitudes regarding outgroups were accurately being 
measured. This is an open question, and will necessitate future research in which 
multiple methods are utilized. For the present, there does seem to be a relatively greater 
social acceptance of outgroup negativity in both groups studied. Individuals admitted to 
greater prejudice in both the sports domain and the moral domain as compared to 
prejudice felt toward members of other races or religions. This is not surprising given 
that in sports, bashing the other team and its fans is quite natural. Additionally, in the 
moral domain, and especially with regard to the conflict on abortion in the United 
States, outgroup hostility is not subtle. Interestingly, however, despite the group’s 
willingness to express negativity in terms of emotions, threat and social distance, they 
were probably uncomfortable thinking of their responses as “prejudices.” Although both 
the Red Sox fans and pro-choice advocates indicated a greater willingness to report 
prejudice toward their own outgroup on the scale measuring outgroup prejudice, they 
were nevertheless still well below the midpoint. It seems clear that the word “prejudice” 
itself is very loaded and may not accurately capture individuals’ thoughts. 
Issues for Future Consideration 
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 An important finding from this study was the relative lack of distinction between 
symbolic and realistic threat as theorized by Stephan and Stephan (2000; see also 
Stephan & Renfro, 2002). This is not to say these are not conceptually or theoretically 
different. Rather, people indeed perceive realistic threats to both the self and the group 
that may differ from value threats. It may be that individuals are hypersensitive to moral 
outgroups in such a way that value threat triggers the perception of realistic threat even 
if it is only imagined. Moral conflict therefore seems to involve both, and it may be very 
hard to determine a situation that involves simply symbolic threat without the presence 
of realistic threat. Therefore, there may be little practicality and even importance in 
attempting to distinguish one from the other in this domain. If threat (whether real or 
imagined) is perceived, it may facilitate derogation of the outgroup regardless of what is 
actually being threatened. 
An additional consideration for future research based on the data presented here 
is the importance of distinguishing between ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation. Very early research in this field originally conceptualized these are 
reciprocal processes. However, newer theories of prejudice are consistent with the 
current study in that ingroup favoritism may exist without any outgroup hostility 
intended. Given that it appears that these processes are indeed separate and not mutually 
exclusive, a greater understanding of the psychological distinction between them can 
help to inform our knowledge of motivations for prejudice. Specifically, what factors 
facilitate each response? Threat seems to be related to the derogation of outgroups, but 
the current study does not address the questions of what motivates individuals to favor 
the ingroup as opposed to no bias, for example. Furthermore, what other kinds of group 
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 memberships are related to these types of ingroup-outgroup relationships? It may be 
possible that groups based on racial or religious identities may pose various types of 
moralistic threat. Based on the predictions made in the current study, perhaps racial 
prejudice targeted at ethnic minorities may not be fully a function of ingroup love but a 
psychological need to derogate the outgroup, based on perceived threat. Future research 
should try to address where on possible continua of ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation other types of prejudice lie. It may be that the groups selected for the current 
study represent groups towards the extremes of each continuum. 
Relatedly, the evidence presented here suggests that a moral context is 
associated with threat and derogation. Does it then follow that all outgroup derogation 
comes from threat? And in turn, does the presence of threat imply moral conflict? These 
are again open questions for future research. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986) hypothesizes outgroup hostility under certain conditions, such as when the 
outgroup hinders an ingroup’s goal for positive distinctiveness. It is unclear, though, 
whether this is simply a reaction to an outgroup’s behavior by attempting to increase the 
extent to which one favors the ingroup, or whether a hindrance of this type actually 
presents a type of threat. Moreover, would a threat of this type be moral or non-moral in 
nature? Generally, the present research begs the question as to how broadly the 
morality-threat-derogation phenomenon generalizes.   
In conclusion, considerably more research is needed in the area of moral conflict 
to more clearly identify the psychological mechanisms of prejudice that is based in 
moral beliefs. This study has advanced our understanding of the central role of threat 
(and outgroup derogation) in moral conflicts. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
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 derogation do seem to be separable phenomena, and seem to increase or decrease 
depending on the situation and the types of groups being evaluated. A theoretical 
framework of prejudice may help to inform the psychological understanding of moral 
conflict for this very reason, but clearly these data suggest that morality may be used to 
help inform our understanding of prejudice as well. 
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 Table 1. Means and standard deviations of all dependent measures 
 Moral Condition Non-moral Condition 
 M SD M SD 
Positive  ingroup emotions 5.63 2.27 6.94 1.36 
Positive outgroup emotions 1.52 1.51 1.42 1.13 
Negative ingroup emotions .37 .79 .36 .75 
Negative outgroup emotions 3.29 1.92 2.19 1.67 
Ingroup threat -3.42 1.16 -3.36 .96 
Outgroup threat .47 1.93 -2.47 1.56 
Ingroup social distance 7.34 1.61 7.91 1.50 
Outgroup social distance 3.03 1.45 3.46 1.78 
Total ingroup adjectives checked 4.91 2.92 8.62 5.30 
Total outgroup adjectives checked 7.29 3.50 8.28 5.93 
Ingroup prejudice .55 1.27 .21 .64 
Outgroup prejudice 2.45 1.74 2.62 1.96 
Race prejudice .90 1.04 .86 1.03 
Religion prejudice .80 .99 .67 1.02 
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 Table 2. Correlations among all dependent measures. 
 1 2 3 4 
1 Positive  ingroup emotions 1    
2 Positive outgroup emotions -.152 1   
3 Negative ingroup emotions -.420 -.020 1  
4 Negative outgroup emotions .222 .380 .011 1 
5 Ingroup threat -.362 .080 .491 -.068 
6 Outgroup threat .046 -.194 .020 .568 
7 Ingroup social distance .674 -.140 -.444 .321 
8 Outgroup social distance -.206 .547 .173 -.488 
9 Total ingroup adjectives checked .286 .067 .055 .018 
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked .246 .088 .059 .199 
11 Ingroup prejudice -.063 -.044 .143 .154 
12 Outgroup prejudice .236 -.304 .048 .508 
13 Race prejudice -.105 -.044 .234 .085 
14 Religion prejudice -.012 -.137 .182 .284 
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 Table 2. Continued. 
 5 6 7 8 
6 Outgroup threat .164 1   
7 Ingroup social distance -.439 .070 1  
8 Outgroup social distance .112 -.427 -.125 1 
9 Total ingroup adjectives checked .066 -.181 .130 .062 
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked -.003 .127 .145 -.039 
11 Ingroup prejudice .150 .229 -.027 -.069 
12 Outgroup prejudice .042 .273 .267 -.344 
13 Race prejudice .096 .002 -.067 .014 
14 Religion prejudice .129 .200 .009 -.113 
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 Table 2. Continued. 
 9 10 11 12 13 
10 Total outgroup adjectives checked .795 1    
11 Ingroup prejudice .002 -.009 1   
12 Outgroup prejudice .151 .141 .005 1  
13 Race prejudice .066 .017 .154 .238 1 
14 Religion prejudice -.017 .064 .191 .328 .573 
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 Table 3. Factor loadings for ingroup emotions 
 Positive Emotion Negative Emotion 
Anger -.031 .864 
Disgust .098 .907 
Fear .071 .893 
Pity -.061 .532 
Anxiety .085 .334 
Hurt -.079 .334 
Sadness -.184 .287 
Negativity -.251 .563 
Respect .721 -.006 
Happiness .957 .102 
Pride .916 .024 
Security .782 -.038 
Positivity .875 -.081 
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 Table 4. Factor loadings for outgroup emotions. 
 Positive Emotion Negative Emotion 
Anger -.102 .770 
Disgust -.097 .793 
Fear .126 .761 
Pity -.051 .601 
Anxiety .104 .703 
Hurt .110 .722 
Sadness .083 .769 
Negativity -.181 .684 
Respect .647 .099 
Happiness .830 .005 
Pride .694 .092 
Security .552 .017 
Positivity .784 -.097 
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 Figure 1. Intensity of positive emotions as a function of group type and condition. 
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 Figure 2. Intensity of negative emotions as a function of group type and condition. 
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 Figure 3. Perceived threat as a function of group type and condition. 
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 Figure 4. Desire for social distance as a function of group type and condition. 
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 Figure 5. Total trait adjectives checked as a function of group type and condition. 
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 APPENDIX 
MATERIALS 
Please note the following survey is from the moral condition and only lists the 
outgroup items. 
We are interested in your perceptions of other groups of people, and would like 
you to specifically focus on the issue of abortion. Those who are against legalized 
abortion are typically given the label “pro-life” while those who support legal 
abortion are often labeled “pro-choice.” At this time, please think about people 
who fall into the category of “pro-life” with respect to the issue of abortion and 
answer the following questions. Please circle your response. 
 
1) To what extent do you feel angry when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
2) To what extent do you feel disgusted when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
3) To what extent do you feel fear when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
4) To what extent do you feel pity when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
5) To what extent do you feel envious when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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6) To what extent do you feel resentful when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
7) To what extent do you feel anxious when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
8) To what extent do you feel contempt when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
9) To what extent do you feel guilty when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
10) To what extent do you feel respectful when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
11) To what extent do you feel happy when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
12) To what extent do you feel hurt when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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13) To what extent do you feel sad when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
14) To what extent do you feel proud when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
15) To what extent do you feel secure when thinking about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
16) To what extent do you feel sympathetic when thinking about people who are pro-
life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
17) To what extent do you feel positive about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
18) To what extent do you feel negative about people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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19) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life have good or bad intentions? 
 
Very bad 
intentions 
Bad 
intentions 
Slightly 
bad 
intentions 
Neither 
good nor 
bad 
intentions 
Slightly 
good 
intentions
Good 
intentions 
Very good 
intentions 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
20) People who are pro-life would not feel bad about harming other groups of people. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
 
21) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life act out of selfish motivation? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
22) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life act out of ethical principles? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
23) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life are motivated by fairness 
concerns? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
24) To what extent do you believe people who are pro-life are motivated by the desire 
to gain power? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
25) People who identify as pro-life are a threat to American society. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 51 
 
 26) People who identify as pro-life are not trustworthy. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
27) People who are pro-life are a threat to my values. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
28) People who are pro-life threaten my personal freedoms and rights. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
29) People who are pro-life violate norms of justice and fairness by choice. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
30) People who are pro-life hold values inconsistent with the values of American 
society. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
31) People who are pro-life threaten economic opportunities of others. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 32) People who are pro-life are a threat to the physical health of others in society. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
33) People who are pro-life are a threat to the physical safety of others in society. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
34) People who are pro-life hurt the overall functioning of American society. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Slightly 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Please continue to think about people who are pro-life and evaluate the degree to 
which you believe traits from the list are representative of this group. Please make 
a check mark next to as many traits you believe are descriptive of this group. 
 
Lazy _________ Moral _________ 
Fun _________ Gregarious _________ 
Ignorant _________ Warm _________ 
Very religious _________ Intolerant _________ 
Stupid _________ Aggressive _________ 
Naïve _________ Cold _________ 
Unreliable _________ Loyal to family _________ 
Pleasure loving _________ Arrogant _________ 
Competent _________ Ambitious _________ 
Hostile _________ Tradition loving _________ 
Slovenly _________ Selfish _________ 
Empathetic _________ Uncaring _________ 
Intelligent _________ Sensitive _________ 
Unsympathetic _________ Immoral _________ 
Materialistic _________ Ill-intentioned _________ 
Cruel _________   
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 Now please indicate to what extent you would be happy if someone who was pro-
life was one of the following people. 
 
I would be happy to have someone who is pro-life as: 
 
President of the United States 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Governor of my state 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
A neighbor 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
The owner of a store I regularly shop at 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
My personal doctor 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
My spiritual advisor 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
A close friend 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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 Someone I would personally date 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
A roommate 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Someone who marries into my family 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
The teacher of my children 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
A coworker 
 
Not at 
all 
   Moderately    Extremely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Please now continue to think about people who are pro-life and how they feel on 
the following issues. Indicate the degree to which you believe people who are pro-
life approve or disapprove of the following issues.  
 
Affirmative action in college admissions 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
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 Embryonic stem cell research 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
An energy tax on SUVs and luxury cars 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Capital punishment (i.e., the death penalty) 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Immediate withdrawal of military forces from Iraq 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Government welfare programs for the poor 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Higher taxes for the rich 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
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Gay marriage 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Legalization of marijuana 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Adoption of children by same-sex couples 
 
Strongly 
Disapprove 
   Neither 
Approve nor 
Disapprove 
   Strongly 
Approve 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
 
To what extent do you believe you are a person who feels prejudice against people of 
other races? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
To what extent do you believe you are a person who feels prejudice against people of 
other religions? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
To what extent do you believe you feel prejudice against people who are pro-life? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
To what extent do you believe you feel prejudice against people who are pro-choice? 
 
Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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 Please answer the following questions thinking about how you generally feel about 
others 
 
1) One should be kind to all people 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
2) One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
3) A person should be concerned with the well-being of others 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
4) There should be equality for everyone – because we are all human beings 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
5) Those who are unable to provide for their basic needs should be helped by others 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
6) A good society is one in which people feel responsible for one another 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7) Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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8) Acting to protect the rights and interests of others members of the community is a 
major obligation for all persons 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
9) In dealing with criminals, the courts should recognize that many are victims of 
circumstances 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
10) Prosperous nations have a moral obligation to share some of their wealth with poor 
nations 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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 Background Information: 
 
Gender: ___male    ___female 
 
Age: ____               Class year:  ___freshman   ___sophomore   ___junior   ___senior 
 
Race/Ethnicity:  ___Black   ___Latino/Hispanic   ___Asian   ___White   ___Other   
 
Religion:  ___Catholic   ___Evangelical Christian   ___Protestant    
                 ___Jewish   ___Muslim   ___Buddhist   ___Other 
 
To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? 
  not at all                                                                                                              extremely 
  religious                   religious 
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
How important a role does religion play in your life? 
not at all                                                                                                              extremely 
important               important 
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
      
Where would you place yourself politically on the following two scales?   
     very                                                   neither                                                     very 
    liberal                                                                                 conservative   
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
    strong                                neither                                                  strong  
   Democrat                                   Republican
  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
 
How much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives? 
dislike extremely           like extremely
  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
 
How much do you tend to like or dislike political liberals? 
dislike extremely           like extremely
  
        1                   2                   3                   4                   5                   6                   7 
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